Two additions to Credential Sharing. `logicsrc credentials rotate` (alias `logicsrc secrets rotate`) re-keys a team vault: fresh DEK, re-sealed to the members who keep access, every secret re-encrypted under it. Values do not change, so nothing that consumes them breaks; what changes is that every wrapped key issued before the rotation is dead. --active (the default) keeps only active members and revokes the rest -- the "someone left" rotation. --all keeps everyone who holds access, for plain hygiene. Dry run by default, like `sync`. The DEK is recoverable ONLY through the grants, so a half-applied rotation makes a vault permanently unreadable by everyone. The whole next state therefore goes to the server in one request and commits in one transaction (new db.batch helper). The server also requires every submitted fingerprint to equal the stored one: it cannot see values, but it can prove a re-key did not swap any. Rotations that would leave the caller ungranted, grant nobody, or cover the wrong secret count are rejected before anything is written. GET /vaults/:id/grants now returns publicKey and status so a client can re-seal in one pass instead of N+1 user lookups, and revocation finally deletes the grant row rather than leaving one that reports access it no longer confers. The sh1pt adapter is the fifth provider. It is the only one driven through a CLI rather than HTTP, because sh1pt publishes `sh1pt secret set|get|list|rm` as the interface to its vault and documents no REST endpoint. Values go over the child's stdin, never argv -- a secret in argv is readable by any user on the host via ps. Since `sh1pt secret get` needs interactive confirmation it cannot be scripted, so the adapter is write-only for values like github-secrets: a sync target, never a source, no value-restoring rollback. Tests drive a real fake sh1pt binary rather than a mocked execFile, which is how the hang surfaced: with nothing to pipe, stdin was left open and any subcommand that reads it would wait forever. It is now always closed. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Credential Sharing OpenSpec
Status: reference implementation available (@logicsrc/plugin-credential-sharing)
Slug: credential-sharing
Reference Implementation
The spec below is implemented by plugins/credential-sharing and surfaced through
logicsrc credentials <command>. All four first providers (env, doppler,
railway, github-secrets) ship as provider adapters.
# List adapters and their capabilities (which can read values vs. write-only)
logicsrc credentials providers
# Inspect an endpoint — redacted key names + value fingerprints, never raw values
logicsrc credentials inspect --provider env --path .env
# Diff a source against a target without moving anything
logicsrc credentials diff --from env --from-path .env --to railway \
--to-project <projectId> --to-config <environmentId>
# Build a plan (stored under .logicsrc/credentials), then dry-run, then apply
logicsrc credentials plan --from env --from-path .env --to doppler \
--to-project <project> --to-config <config>
logicsrc credentials sync --plan <planId> # dry-run (no writes)
logicsrc credentials sync --plan <planId> --approve # writes to the target
# Audit and reverse a run (rollback emits a NEW plan)
logicsrc credentials audit --run <runId> --format markdown
logicsrc credentials rollback --run <runId>
SDK usage mirrors the spec via createCredentialEngine() from the plugin package.
Implementation notes:
- Value fingerprints are salted SHA-256 (truncated) so two endpoints can be diffed without revealing values; they are equality/integrity markers, not secret storage.
github-secretsis write-only for values (GitHub never returns secret values), so it cannot be a sync source or a value-restoring rollback target. Secret writes are libsodium sealed-box encrypted against the repo/org/environment public key.- Rollback captures the target's prior values into a 0600 vault under
.logicsrc/(gitignored) — the only place raw values touch disk. Plans, runs, and audit records contain fingerprints only.
Credential Sharing is a LogicSRC OpenSpec for portable, auditable secret synchronization across local files and infrastructure providers. It is intended to replace closed, proprietary credential-sharing workflows with a provider-neutral contract.
LogicSRC defines the open objects, CLI commands, SDK calls, TUI states, PWA states, provider adapter capabilities, and audit records. External products may consume this contract, but LogicSRC does not call out to product-specific commands.
First Providers
env
doppler
railway
github-secrets
sh1pt
.env: read, diff, redact, and write local environment files.- Doppler: sync project/config scoped secrets.
- Railway: sync service variables.
- GitHub Secrets: sync repository, organization, and environment secrets.
- sh1pt: sync the distribution credential vault — App Store Connect keys, Play service accounts, npm and Docker tokens, Cloudflare tokens.
sh1pt is the one adapter driven through a CLI rather than an HTTP API,
because sh1pt publishes sh1pt secret set|get|list|rm as the interface to its
vault and documents no REST endpoint for it. That is a transport choice inside
an adapter, which is the layer where product-specific I/O belongs; it does not
move product-specific commands into the core contract. Two consequences worth
stating:
- Values are written on the child process's stdin, never as argv. A secret
passed as a command-line argument is readable by any user on the host via
psfor the lifetime of the call. sh1pt secret getrequires interactive confirmation and so cannot be scripted. The adapter is therefore write-only for values (readValues: false), exactly likegithub-secrets: it can be a sync target but never a source, and it supports no value-restoring rollback.
Core Objects
credential_provider
credential_source
credential_target
credential_key
credential_fingerprint
credential_policy
credential_diff
credential_sync_plan
credential_sync_run
credential_approval
credential_rollback
credential_audit_event
CLI Spec
Command namespace:
logicsrc credentials <command>
Required commands:
providers
inspect
plan
diff
approve
sync
rotate
rollback
audit
export
logicsrc secrets … is an accepted alias for logicsrc credentials ….
Examples:
logicsrc credentials providers
logicsrc credentials plan --from env --to railway
logicsrc credentials plan --from doppler --to github-secrets
logicsrc credentials diff --from env --to doppler --redact
logicsrc credentials sync --plan cred_plan_123 --approve
logicsrc credentials audit --run cred_run_123 --format markdown
Security Rules
- Raw secret values must never be printed by default.
- Audit logs should store key names, targets, timestamps, actor identity, and value fingerprints, not raw values.
- Every write operation should support dry-run mode.
- Provider adapters must declare read/write capabilities before a plan is generated.
- Destructive changes require explicit approval.
- Rollbacks must be represented as new sync plans rather than hidden mutation history.
SDK Spec
All SDKs should expose the same conceptual API:
listCredentialProviders()
inspectCredentialSource(source)
createCredentialSyncPlan(input)
diffCredentialTargets(planId)
approveCredentialSync(planId, approval)
runCredentialSync(planId)
rollbackCredentialSync(runId)
exportCredentialAudit(runId)
Provider Adapter Contract
Provider adapters implement the LogicSRC credential provider contract:
provider.id
provider.capabilities
provider.auth_requirements
provider.inspect()
provider.diff()
provider.write()
provider.rollback()
provider.audit()
The adapter boundary lets tools such as a PWA, TUI, CI workflow, or external CLI consume the same open standard without making LogicSRC depend on any specific product.
Team Sharing (end-to-end encrypted)
The team provider adds a fifth endpoint type — a hosted, end-to-end-encrypted
team vault — so you can share credentials with teammates by email instead of
passing .env files over chat. It is addressed as team:<team-slug>/<vault-name>
(endpoint.project = team slug, endpoint.config = vault name).
Trust model
The server (commandboard-api, routes under /api/credshare) is a zero-knowledge
relay for secret values. It stores only:
- member identity public keys (X25519),
- the vault data-encryption key (DEK) sealed to each member's public key
(
crypto_box_seal), one wrapped copy per member, - secret ciphertext + nonce (
crypto_secretbox), plus a salted fingerprint for redacted diffs.
Plaintext secret values and the raw DEK never leave a member's machine. Granting a
teammate access = an existing member unwraps the DEK with their private key and
re-wraps (seals) it to the new member's public key. The private key lives only in
~/.logicsrc/identity.json (mode 0600) and is never uploaded.
CLI
# One-time: log in through your browser (registers this device's identity key).
logicsrc login
# Owner: create a team, push a local .env into an encrypted vault, invite people.
# A vault is addressed as <project> <env>, stored as the vault name
# project--env (a double dash: the server slugs vault names through
# /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,62}$/, so a "/" would be rejected).
logicsrc teams create acme --name "Acme Inc"
logicsrc teams push acme web prod --env .env # encrypt + upload
logicsrc teams invite acme teammate@example.com # emails an accept link
# Teammate: accept, then get granted, then pull + decrypt locally.
logicsrc login
logicsrc teams accept <token-from-email>
# …an existing member runs: logicsrc teams grant acme web prod teammate@example.com
logicsrc teams pull acme web prod --env .env # download + decrypt
# Inspect / manage
logicsrc teams list
logicsrc teams members acme
logicsrc teams vaults acme
Rotating a vault key
# Dry run (the default): show what a rotation would re-key and revoke.
logicsrc credentials rotate acme web prod
# Apply it.
logicsrc credentials rotate acme web prod --approve
# Every vault in the team that you can open.
logicsrc secrets rotate acme --approve
Rotation replaces the vault DEK, re-seals it to the members who keep access, and re-encrypts every secret under it. Secret values do not change — nothing that consumes them breaks. What changes is that every wrapped key issued before the rotation is dead, so a copy of an old grant buys nothing.
Who keeps access:
--active(default): only members whose team status isactiveand who hold a grant today. This is the "someone left the team" rotation — everyone else is revoked.--all: everyone holding a grant today, whatever their status. Pure crypto hygiene, no revocation.
A member who holds access but has never uploaded a public key cannot be re-sealed
to; they are reported under skipped and revoked rather than dropped silently.
Safety properties, all enforced rather than documented:
- The whole next state is applied in one transaction. The DEK is recoverable only through the grants, so a half-applied rotation — new grants over old ciphertext, or the reverse — would make the vault permanently unreadable.
- The server requires every submitted fingerprint to equal the stored one. It cannot see values, but it can prove a rotation did not swap any.
- A rotation that would leave the caller ungranted, grant nobody, or cover the wrong number of secrets is rejected before anything is written.
logicsrc login picks its flow from the machine it runs on:
- Has its own browser → loopback OAuth-PKCE: a
127.0.0.1listener catches the callback. Force it with--web. - No browser (SSH, droplet, container, CI) → device authorization: the CLI
prints a short code, you approve it from a browser on any other machine.
Force it with
--device. A loopback redirect would be useless here — the browser's127.0.0.1is not the CLI's machine. - Unattended →
--token lsk_…from Settings ▸ API keys.
It talks to the hosted credentials app by default. Point it elsewhere (local dev,
self-hosted) with LOGICSRC_API=http://localhost:8080 logicsrc login or
logicsrc login --api-url …; the chosen origin is remembered in
~/.logicsrc/identity.json once login succeeds.
Because team is a normal provider, the generic sync surface works too — e.g.
logicsrc credentials plan --from env --from-path .env --to team --to-project acme --to-config prod, then diff, sync, audit, and rollback behave exactly as
with the other providers.
Server + web
- Server storage is behind a
CredShareStoreinterface: an in-memory store for local dev/tests, and a Supabase-backed store (SUPABASE_URL+SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY) for production. Migration:supabase/migrations/*_credshare.sql(deny-by-default RLS). - Email (login codes + invites) uses Resend when
RESEND_API_KEYis set; without it, codes/tokens are returned in the API response for local use. logicsrc.com/teamsis a management surface only: log in by email, view teams/members/vaults and invite/accept. The browser holds no private key, so it never decrypts — decryption happens only in the CLI.