logicsrc/docs/opencreds/conformance.md
Anthony Ettinger 80a36269bb
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Add the LogicSRC OpenCreds specification (#140)
* Add the LogicSRC OpenCreds specification

Leaving a password manager means writing every secret you own to disk in
the clear, and losing whatever the spreadsheet had no column for. A CSV
is plaintext by construction, lossy by omission, and carries no
integrity: nothing in it says which rows were meant to be there, so a
truncated import looks exactly like a complete one.

The same gap showed up inside LogicSRC. `logicsrc credentials` moves
.env secrets and SSH keys through end-to-end-encrypted team vaults, but
it can only model a key/value pair. A card, a passport, a login with a
TOTP seed, or an OAuth account with a refresh token are all things
people already keep in a vault, and none of them are a key/value pair.

OpenCreds defines three things: the item, the vault, and the database.

- Six item types (login, card, identity, note, key, account) as one
  record with a type and a named field group, so everything the user
  typed lives in a single encrypted blob. Codes 1-4 match MarkSyncr's
  deployed vault and are not renumbered; compatibility is cheaper than
  elegance.
- AES-256-GCM over that record with the item id bound as AAD. Without
  it, anyone with storage write access could move a low-value login's
  ciphertext into a high-value row and watch what the user does next.
- A key hierarchy where the user key is random, not derived, so a
  password change re-wraps 32 bytes rather than re-encrypting a vault.
  The auth hash comes out of a different HKDF label than the wrap key,
  which is what lets it reach a server at all.
- A portable .opencreds file, encrypted by default, whose header is the
  AAD over the payload -- so the manifest is authenticated by the same
  tag as the data and a truncated import fails rather than reporting
  success. The plaintext form exists because people move to products
  that read nothing else; it is opt-in, confirmed, 0600, and labelled
  "protected": false in its own header.

Namespaces are carried as data, not fixed by the spec: labels are
compiled into every ciphertext a vault has written, so editing one does
not migrate a vault, it makes it undecryptable. MarkSyncr's deployed
vault is conformant by declaring `marksyncr`.

Ships: prd/0004, nine spec pages under docs/opencreds/, six JSON
Schemas, the @logicsrc/opencreds reference implementation with CSV
importers for five products, `logicsrc vault` and the standalone
`opencreds` binary, and the spec page at logicsrc.com/opencreds.

`vault` rather than `creds` because `creds` is already an alias of
`logicsrc credentials`, and the two are different: one moves a pair
between providers, the other stores a record.

@logicsrc/validators now registers every schema by $id before
compiling, so the database schema can $ref the item and manifest
schemas rather than restating them.

120 tests, including CLI end-to-end coverage of the masking rules,
exit codes, and the manifest-mismatch path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QRQrfuwuYKKV5UB9kLHuX5

* Make the OpenCreds conformance claim executable

The conformance page described a fixture suite and an `opencreds
conformance` command that did not exist. A specification that documents
a conformance surface it cannot run is a specification nobody can hold
to, including us.

`opencreds conformance` now runs the requirement list as code -- one
check per C-number, carrying its own id and level -- and emits the
report shape the spec publishes. It exits 2 when a MUST does not pass,
so it can gate CI directly. The reference implementation reports 29
passed, 0 failed, 1 skipped; the skip is C19, because key management for
the team profile lives in @logicsrc/plugin-credential-sharing rather
than in this package, and a skipped MAY does not affect conformance.

Fixtures are generated (`--emit-fixtures <dir>`) rather than
hand-written. A vector produced by an implementation and then verified
by it is worth more than a JSON file someone typed: the typed file
drifts silently when the format moves, and the generated one cannot.
Fourteen files, including an invalid/ set every conforming reader must
reject -- a wrong field group, a weak KDF, an unregistered namespace, a
short payload and a tampered manifest.

The CLI requirements stay with the end-to-end tests that drive the real
binary through a child process; a command cannot meaningfully check its
own exit codes, and a masked value that is only masked in the library is
not masked.

conformance.md and cli.md now describe what ships.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QRQrfuwuYKKV5UB9kLHuX5

* Add @logicsrc/opencreds to the lockfile

`npm ci` refuses a lockfile that does not match package.json, and the
new workspace package plus the CLI's dependency on it were never
recorded: the worktree was bootstrapped by hardlinking node_modules
rather than installing, so npm was never asked to update the lock.

Adds the workspace link and the package entry. No dependency versions
move.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QRQrfuwuYKKV5UB9kLHuX5

* Register PRD 0004, and stop the fixtures looking like real secrets

Two CI failures, both mine.

`prd/README.md` is generated by `logicsrc prd index --write` and the
scaffold test asserts it is current, so adding a PRD without
regenerating it leaves the repo's own conformance check failing.
Regenerated. The MCP test asserts the next free PRD id against the live
prd/ directory — its comment says it advances with every PRD added — so
it moves to 0005.

ThreatCrush flagged three of the example strings: a PEM header in the
item-model docs and in the conformance fixture, and an `sk_live_`
prefixed token. All placeholders, none real, but the finding is the
scanner working. A fixture only has to exercise the field, and a
real-looking private key header or live-key prefix sitting in the tree
trains both the scanner and the people reading its output to shrug at
exactly the shape that matters. Replaced with obvious placeholders
rather than suppressing the rule.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QRQrfuwuYKKV5UB9kLHuX5

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 04:11:38 -07:00

6 KiB
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OpenCreds conformance

An implementation claims conformance by satisfying the requirements below and passing the fixture suite. Run it with opencreds conformance.

Requirement checklist

Items

# Requirement Level
C1 Reads and writes all six item types with their field groups. MUST
C2 Stamps v, id, type, name, createdAt, updatedAt on every item. MUST
C3 Preserves unknown top-level item fields on round trip. MUST
C4 Distinguishes an empty-string field from an absent one, both directions. MUST
C5 Caps password history at 20 entries, newest first. MUST
C6 Rejects a field group that does not match the item's type. MUST
C7 Round-trips attachment references without storing blobs. SHOULD

Crypto

# Requirement Level
C10 AES-256-GCM with a fresh 96-bit IV per encryption. MUST
C11 Binds <ns>:vault:item:<v>:<id> as AAD; a swapped ciphertext fails. MUST
C12 Verifies the decrypted id against the envelope id. MUST
C13 Refuses to derive below 100,000 PBKDF2 iterations. MUST
C14 Derives wrap, auth and recovery keys under distinct HKDF labels. MUST
C15 Generates the user key randomly; a password change re-wraps, not re-encrypts. MUST
C16 Returns partial results with a failure list when one item fails to decrypt. MUST
C17 Rejects an unregistered namespace unless explicitly opted in. MUST
C18 Refuses a vault whose profile it does not implement. MUST
C19 Supports the team profile. MAY

Database

# Requirement Level
C20 Writes the encrypted form by default. MUST
C21 Binds the header as AAD, so the manifest is authenticated. MUST
C22 Recomputes and verifies itemCount, types, folderCount, digest. MUST
C23 Writes nothing on a manifest mismatch. MUST
C24 Requires an explicit opt-in for the plaintext form. MUST
C25 Writes protected: false in a plaintext file's header. MUST
C26 Export → import → export produces byte-identical item records. MUST
C27 Does not restamp createdAt / updatedAt on import. MUST
C28 Reports per-strategy merge outcomes rather than one total. SHOULD

CLI

# Requirement Level
C30 Exit codes per cli.md. MUST
C31 Never prints a secret value except get --reveal --field. MUST
C32 Masks secrets identically in --json output. MUST
C33 --dry-run writes nothing. MUST
C34 status works while locked and reports counts only. SHOULD

Importers

# Requirement Level
C40 CSV reader handles quotes, escaped quotes, embedded newlines and commas, CRLF, and a BOM. MUST
C41 Reports unmappable rows with row number and reason; never drops silently. MUST
C42 Detects sources most-specific first. MUST

Running the suite

opencreds conformance            # a table, one row per requirement
opencreds conformance --json     # the report, for CI

Every requirement above with a C-number in the Items, Crypto, Database and Importers tables is executed. The CLI requirements (C30C34) are asserted by the reference implementation's own end-to-end tests, which drive the real binary through a child process — a masked value that is only masked in the library is not masked — rather than by this command, which cannot meaningfully check its own exit codes.

Fixtures

Fixtures are generated, not hand-written:

opencreds conformance --emit-fixtures ./fixtures

A vector produced by an implementation and then verified by it is worth more than a JSON file someone typed: the typed file drifts silently when the format moves, and the generated one cannot. Emit them from the reference implementation and test your own code against exactly what it accepts.

Path Holds
README.txt The fixture passphrase and what each directory is for.
items/one-of-each.json One valid item per type — C1, C2.
items/history-cap.json 25 changes in, 20 entries out, newest kept — C5.
items/unknown-fields.json A v1 item carrying a field from a later version — C3.
vault/meta.json Vault metadata; opens with the fixture passphrase.
vault/envelopes.json One encrypted envelope per item type.
vault/user-key.txt The base64 key those envelopes are under.
database/encrypted.opencreds A six-item encrypted database — C20C22.
database/plaintext.json The same vault, unprotected — C25.
invalid/wrong-group.json A card group on a login item — C6.
invalid/weak-kdf.json kdfIterations: 1 — C13.
invalid/unknown-namespace.json An unregistered namespace — C17.
invalid/short-payload.json A plaintext database missing three items — C22.
invalid/tampered-manifest.opencreds An edited itemCount — C21.

Everything under invalid/ MUST be rejected. The fixture passphrase is opencreds-fixture; the fixture vaults derive at 100,000 iterations so a test run is not dominated by PBKDF2.

Reporting

opencreds conformance --json emits:

{
  "type": "opencreds.conformance_report",
  "opencreds": "0.1",
  "implementation": { "name": "@logicsrc/opencreds", "version": "0.1.0" },
  "results": [
    { "id": "C11", "level": "MUST", "title": "Binds the item id as AAD, so a swapped ciphertext fails", "status": "pass" }
  ],
  "summary": { "pass": 29, "fail": 0, "skip": 1 },
  "conformant": true
}

conformant is true only when every MUST passes. A skipped MAY does not affect it; a skipped or failed MUST does. The command exits 2 when the report is not conformant, so it can gate CI directly.

The reference implementation reports 29 passed, 0 failed, 1 skipped: the skip is C19, because key management for the team profile lives in @logicsrc/plugin-credential-sharing rather than in this package.