logicsrc/docs/opencreds/cli.md
Anthony Ettinger 80a36269bb
Some checks failed
CI / build (push) Has been cancelled
test / test (push) Has been cancelled
Add the LogicSRC OpenCreds specification (#140)
* Add the LogicSRC OpenCreds specification

Leaving a password manager means writing every secret you own to disk in
the clear, and losing whatever the spreadsheet had no column for. A CSV
is plaintext by construction, lossy by omission, and carries no
integrity: nothing in it says which rows were meant to be there, so a
truncated import looks exactly like a complete one.

The same gap showed up inside LogicSRC. `logicsrc credentials` moves
.env secrets and SSH keys through end-to-end-encrypted team vaults, but
it can only model a key/value pair. A card, a passport, a login with a
TOTP seed, or an OAuth account with a refresh token are all things
people already keep in a vault, and none of them are a key/value pair.

OpenCreds defines three things: the item, the vault, and the database.

- Six item types (login, card, identity, note, key, account) as one
  record with a type and a named field group, so everything the user
  typed lives in a single encrypted blob. Codes 1-4 match MarkSyncr's
  deployed vault and are not renumbered; compatibility is cheaper than
  elegance.
- AES-256-GCM over that record with the item id bound as AAD. Without
  it, anyone with storage write access could move a low-value login's
  ciphertext into a high-value row and watch what the user does next.
- A key hierarchy where the user key is random, not derived, so a
  password change re-wraps 32 bytes rather than re-encrypting a vault.
  The auth hash comes out of a different HKDF label than the wrap key,
  which is what lets it reach a server at all.
- A portable .opencreds file, encrypted by default, whose header is the
  AAD over the payload -- so the manifest is authenticated by the same
  tag as the data and a truncated import fails rather than reporting
  success. The plaintext form exists because people move to products
  that read nothing else; it is opt-in, confirmed, 0600, and labelled
  "protected": false in its own header.

Namespaces are carried as data, not fixed by the spec: labels are
compiled into every ciphertext a vault has written, so editing one does
not migrate a vault, it makes it undecryptable. MarkSyncr's deployed
vault is conformant by declaring `marksyncr`.

Ships: prd/0004, nine spec pages under docs/opencreds/, six JSON
Schemas, the @logicsrc/opencreds reference implementation with CSV
importers for five products, `logicsrc vault` and the standalone
`opencreds` binary, and the spec page at logicsrc.com/opencreds.

`vault` rather than `creds` because `creds` is already an alias of
`logicsrc credentials`, and the two are different: one moves a pair
between providers, the other stores a record.

@logicsrc/validators now registers every schema by $id before
compiling, so the database schema can $ref the item and manifest
schemas rather than restating them.

120 tests, including CLI end-to-end coverage of the masking rules,
exit codes, and the manifest-mismatch path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QRQrfuwuYKKV5UB9kLHuX5

* Make the OpenCreds conformance claim executable

The conformance page described a fixture suite and an `opencreds
conformance` command that did not exist. A specification that documents
a conformance surface it cannot run is a specification nobody can hold
to, including us.

`opencreds conformance` now runs the requirement list as code -- one
check per C-number, carrying its own id and level -- and emits the
report shape the spec publishes. It exits 2 when a MUST does not pass,
so it can gate CI directly. The reference implementation reports 29
passed, 0 failed, 1 skipped; the skip is C19, because key management for
the team profile lives in @logicsrc/plugin-credential-sharing rather
than in this package, and a skipped MAY does not affect conformance.

Fixtures are generated (`--emit-fixtures <dir>`) rather than
hand-written. A vector produced by an implementation and then verified
by it is worth more than a JSON file someone typed: the typed file
drifts silently when the format moves, and the generated one cannot.
Fourteen files, including an invalid/ set every conforming reader must
reject -- a wrong field group, a weak KDF, an unregistered namespace, a
short payload and a tampered manifest.

The CLI requirements stay with the end-to-end tests that drive the real
binary through a child process; a command cannot meaningfully check its
own exit codes, and a masked value that is only masked in the library is
not masked.

conformance.md and cli.md now describe what ships.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QRQrfuwuYKKV5UB9kLHuX5

* Add @logicsrc/opencreds to the lockfile

`npm ci` refuses a lockfile that does not match package.json, and the
new workspace package plus the CLI's dependency on it were never
recorded: the worktree was bootstrapped by hardlinking node_modules
rather than installing, so npm was never asked to update the lock.

Adds the workspace link and the package entry. No dependency versions
move.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QRQrfuwuYKKV5UB9kLHuX5

* Register PRD 0004, and stop the fixtures looking like real secrets

Two CI failures, both mine.

`prd/README.md` is generated by `logicsrc prd index --write` and the
scaffold test asserts it is current, so adding a PRD without
regenerating it leaves the repo's own conformance check failing.
Regenerated. The MCP test asserts the next free PRD id against the live
prd/ directory — its comment says it advances with every PRD added — so
it moves to 0005.

ThreatCrush flagged three of the example strings: a PEM header in the
item-model docs and in the conformance fixture, and an `sk_live_`
prefixed token. All placeholders, none real, but the finding is the
scanner working. A fixture only has to exercise the field, and a
real-looking private key header or live-key prefix sitting in the tree
trains both the scanner and the people reading its output to shrug at
exactly the shape that matters. Replaced with obvious placeholders
rather than suppressing the rule.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QRQrfuwuYKKV5UB9kLHuX5

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-29 04:11:38 -07:00

155 lines
5.7 KiB
Markdown

# The OpenCreds CLI
The CLI is part of the conformance surface: flags, output shapes and exit codes
are specified, not incidental. The same commands ship twice — as
`logicsrc vault …` and as the standalone `opencreds` binary — from one
implementation, so the two can never drift.
## Exit codes
| Code | Meaning |
| --- | --- |
| 0 | Success. |
| 1 | Usage error — unknown flag, missing argument, unreadable file. |
| 2 | Validation failure — a document did not conform. |
| 3 | Crypto failure — wrong password, failed tag, manifest mismatch. |
| 4 | Refused — the operation needs a confirmation that was not given. |
## Vault
```bash
opencreds init [--namespace opencreds] [--iterations 600000] [--password-stdin]
```
Creates a vault. Prompts for a master password twice, prints a recovery key
once, and never prints it again. Refuses if a vault already exists at the target
unless `--force`. `--password-stdin` reads one line instead and skips the
confirmation — for scripted provisioning, where there is nobody to mistype.
```bash
opencreds unlock # prints a session token to export
opencreds unlock --persist [--timeout 15]
opencreds lock # drops a persisted session
opencreds status # vault present? locked? counts by type
```
Unlocking has two shapes, and the difference is a flag rather than a default
because it is a real trade:
- **Token (default).** `unlock` prints `export OPENCREDS_SESSION="…"`. Nothing
touches disk and the session dies with the shell.
- **Persisted (`--persist`).** The same token in a 0600 file with an expiry, so
a script can unlock once and run many commands. A readable user key on disk is
the vault; the command says so when you use it, and `lock` removes it.
`status` is the one command that works locked. It reports counts and never
values, because counts are already observable to whoever holds the storage.
```bash
opencreds recover # unlock with the recovery key, set a new password
```
A password change re-wraps the user key. Not one item is re-encrypted, which is
why it is instant on a vault of any size.
## Items
```bash
opencreds add <type> --name <name> [type flags…]
opencreds list [--type <type>] [--folder <name>] [--search <text>] [--json]
opencreds get <id|name> [--field <path>] [--reveal]
opencreds edit <id|name> [flags…]
opencreds rm <id|name> [--purge]
opencreds restore <id>
```
`list` and `get` MUST NOT print secret values by default. `get` prints the item
with every secret field masked; `--reveal` prints one field named by `--field`,
so revealing is always a deliberate act naming a single value. `--json` output is
masked identically — a pipeline is not an authorization.
Type flags follow the field group names, kebab-cased:
`--username`, `--password`, `--totp`, `--url`,
`--cardholder-name`, `--number`, `--exp-month`, `--exp-year`, `--code`,
`--first-name`, `--last-name`, `--email`, `--phone`, `--address1`, …,
`--key-type`, `--algorithm`, `--public-key`, `--private-key`, `--file`, `--path`, `--mode`,
`--provider`, `--account-id`, `--handle`, `--access-token`, `--refresh-token`, `--scope`.
`--password -` and every other secret flag read from stdin when given `-`, so a
secret need not appear in the shell history or the process list.
## Database
```bash
opencreds export [--out vault.opencreds] [--passphrase-stdin]
opencreds export --plaintext --out vault.json --yes
opencreds export --format bitwarden-csv --out vault.csv --yes
opencreds import <file> [--dry-run] [--merge skip|replace|duplicate]
opencreds import <file> --source bitwarden|onepassword|chrome|lastpass|keepass
```
`export` writes the encrypted form. `--plaintext` prints what it is about to do
and exits 4 without `--yes`.
`import` with `--dry-run` reports counts by type, folders to be created,
duplicates detected and rows that could not be mapped, and writes nothing. A
manifest mismatch exits 3 and writes nothing regardless of flags.
Output of a dry run:
```
opencreds import vault.opencreds --dry-run
Source vault.opencreds (opencreds 0.1, encrypted, namespace opencreds)
Exported 2026-08-29T18:00:00.000Z by @logicsrc/opencreds 0.1.0
Manifest verified — 42 items, 3 folders
login 38 2 already present (skip)
card 2
key 1
account 1
Folders Work, Personal (new), Archive
Skipped 0
Nothing written. Re-run without --dry-run to import.
```
## Validation
```bash
opencreds validate <file> # a database, or a plaintext item document
opencreds validate --stdin
```
Exits 0 when the document conforms, 2 when it does not, and prints one diagnostic
per failure with a JSON pointer into the document:
```
/items/17/login/uris/0/match "fuzzy" is not a valid match rule
/manifest/itemCount says 42, payload has 41
```
## Conformance
```bash
opencreds conformance # a table, one row per requirement
opencreds conformance --json # the report, for CI
opencreds conformance --emit-fixtures <dir> # generate the fixture set
```
Runs the suite against this implementation and reports each requirement as pass,
fail or skip. Exits 2 when a MUST does not pass, so it can gate CI directly. An
implementation claiming conformance SHOULD run it there.
`--emit-fixtures` writes the generated fixture set, so another implementation
can be tested against exactly what this one produces and accepts. See
[conformance.md](./conformance.md).
## What the CLI never does
- It never prints a secret value except through `get --reveal --field`.
- It never writes a plaintext file without an explicit flag and a confirmation.
- It never sends anything anywhere. There is no telemetry, no account, and no
network call in any command listed on this page.