agentbbs/docs/files.md
Anthony Ettinger eb8ef546cf
files: provision-user CLI + anonymous public HTTP serving (#58)
* feat(files): provision-user CLI + anonymous public HTTP serving

Lets external services (the TronBrowser extension store) host files on
files.profullstack.com without the interactive `ssh join@` onboarding.

- `agentbbs provision-user --name <h> --pubkey "<ssh key>"`: registers a member
  from an SSH *public* key (account = handle + key fingerprint). Reuses
  SanitizeUsername (same rules as join@) + EnsureUser; Files/SFTP access is free
  for members, so the account can immediately
  `scp … files@host:/public/extensions/<slug>/`. JSON output; refuses on key/
  handle collision. New auth.FingerprintAuthorizedKey() parses an
  authorized_keys line to the same SHA256 fp as a live session key (tested).
- setup.sh: the files.<host> Caddy site now serves the shared /public area as
  unauthenticated, read-only static files (handle_path /public/*), so .crx/.zip
  download links work for anyone — mapping 1:1 to the SFTP path. Non-/public
  paths still hit the auth'd web file manager.
- docs/files.md updated.

Note: not compiled here — repo go.mod requires go 1.26 and this sandbox has
1.22.2; changes pass gofmt parse/format checks. Reuses existing store/auth APIs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(vet): redundant newline in wish.Println premium-flow messages

`go test ./...` / `go vet ./...` fail on `wish.Println(… "…\n")` — Println
already appends a newline. Pre-existing on main (its CI is red for the same two
lines); surfaced here. Switched both to `wish.Print` with an explicit trailing
"\n\n" so output bytes are unchanged and vet is satisfied.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-25 11:37:45 -07:00

148 lines
5.9 KiB
Markdown

# Files (SFTP) — member storage
AgentBBS gives every verified member file storage over **SFTP**, reachable with
the same SSH key they log in with. It rides the existing `:22` listener as an
SSH *subsystem*, so there is no new port and no separate account:
```bash
# interactive
sftp files@bbs.profullstack.com
# one-shot copies (same endpoint, same key)
scp report.pdf files@bbs.profullstack.com:/me/
rsync -avz ./site/ -e ssh files@bbs.profullstack.com:/me/site/
```
The username (`files`) is conventional and ignored — **identity is your SSH
key** (one key = one account, like the rest of the BBS). `scp`/`rsync` work
because they tunnel over the same SSH transport.
## Who can use it
**Members only — but free for every member.** Like IRC and News, file storage is
gated on membership, *not* on the paid Founding Lifetime plan:
- **Non-members can't connect.** A key that isn't a registered account is
refused at the SFTP handshake (`this key isn't a member — register first`), and
guests don't see the in-hub Files browser.
- **Every verified member can connect, run, and join** — free and paid alike.
There is no Premium gate anywhere in the Files path; the plan only affects
unrelated perks (custom email, domains, Tor).
- Operators can revoke an individual account's SFTP access (abuse response)
without touching its BBS login — see the management TUI below.
## Two areas
When you connect you see a virtual root with two directories:
| Path | What it is | Access |
|---|---|---|
| `/me` | Your **private** per-user workspace | read/write, quota-limited |
| `/public` | The single **shared public file area** (old-school BBS file area) | world-read; members-only write by default |
There is **no** path from one member's `/me` to another's — the only sharing
surface is the one public area (PRD §9.3, amended). Both areas are confined: a
path that tries to escape its root (`../`, an absolute path, or a planted
symlink) is rejected.
## Quotas
Each private workspace has a byte quota (default **1 GiB**, set by
`AGENTBBS_FILES_QUOTA_MB`). Writes that would exceed it fail. Operators can set a
per-user override in the management TUI. The public area is operator-managed and
not metered per user.
## In-BBS browser
Inside the hub, the **Files** entry opens a TUI browser for your workspace and
the public area: navigate, view text files, make directories, rename, and
delete, with a live usage gauge. Actual transfers happen over SFTP/scp/rsync (a
PTY can't move file bytes).
## Operator management TUI
Operators (the `$AGENTBBS_ADMINS` allowlist) reach the SFTP management console
with:
```bash
ssh sftp@bbs.profullstack.com # aliases: sftpadmin@, filesadmin@
```
Panes (Tab to switch):
- **Sessions** — live SFTP connections (user, remote, rx/tx, idle); `x`
force-disconnects.
- **Workspaces** — every member's usage vs. quota; `Q` sets a per-user quota,
`x` revokes/restores SFTP access (the BBS login is unaffected).
- **Public area** — `t` toggles members' write access; `x` removes an entry
(moderation).
Per PRD §9.2 the operator can inspect and act on hosted files; storage is not
content-blind.
## Configuration
| Var | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| `AGENTBBS_FILES` | `1` | enable the SFTP subsystem + Files plugin (`0` disables) |
| `AGENTBBS_FILES_QUOTA_MB` | `1024` | default per-user workspace quota (MB) |
| `AGENTBBS_DATA` | `./data` | storage lives under `<data>/files/{users,public}` |
## Provisioning members from a public key (for external services)
Normally members onboard interactively (`ssh join@`). External services that
want to grant a user file storage without that flow — e.g. the TronBrowser
extension store letting a publisher upload bundles — can register an account
directly from an SSH **public** key (an account is just *handle + key
fingerprint*):
```bash
agentbbs provision-user --name acme --pubkey "ssh-ed25519 AAAA… acme@dev"
# or: --pubkey-file ./id_ed25519.pub
```
It normalizes the handle with the same rules as `join@` (`SanitizeUsername`),
fingerprints the key, and `EnsureUser`s the member; Files/SFTP access is then
available immediately (free for all members). Output is JSON (`{ok, name,
fingerprint, store_id}`); it refuses if the key already belongs to another
member or the handle is taken by a different key. The publisher can then:
```bash
scp dist.crx files@files.profullstack.com:/public/extensions/acme/
```
## Public files over HTTP (anonymous, read-only)
The web file manager at `files.<host>` requires a login even to download, which
is wrong for *shared* artifacts (a `.crx` download link must work for anyone).
So the `files.<host>` Caddy site (generated by `setup.sh`) serves the shared
`/public` area as **unauthenticated, read-only** static files, mapping 1:1 to
the SFTP path:
```
scp x files@files.profullstack.com:/public/extensions/acme/x
-> https://files.profullstack.com/public/extensions/acme/x
```
Everything outside `/public/*` still falls through to the authenticated web
manager (private `/me` browsing).
## Implementation
- `internal/files` — a fully virtual Go SFTP server (`github.com/pkg/sftp` +
`crypto/ssh`); no OS users.
- `backend.go` — service, layout, quota/usage, live-session registry, operator
surface.
- `fs.go` — per-session virtual filesystem: `resolve()` is the single security
chokepoint (area confinement + symlink-escape guard) and the pkg/sftp
request handlers.
- `server.go` — the `wish.WithSubsystem("sftp", …)` handler: key auth → member
session → request server, with byte metering and force-disconnect.
- `tui.go` — the in-BBS member browser plugin.
- `admin.go` — the operator management TUI.
- Storage: `files_access` (per-user quota override + revoked flag) and
`files_settings` (e.g. public-write mode) in the shared SQLite store.
Security is covered by `internal/files/*_test.go`: path-traversal/confinement,
symlink-escape rejection, the public-write ACL, quota enforcement, and an
end-to-end run against a real SFTP client.