logicsrc/packages/schemas/schemas/logicsrc-opencontext-role.schema.json
Anthony Ettinger 3ab8a4b38b
Add the LogicSRC OpenContext specification (#132)
* Add the LogicSRC OpenContext specification

OpenContext is an open specification for durable, portable, permissioned,
provenance-aware context shared between humans and AI agents. It defines how
organizational knowledge is described, authorized, versioned, resolved,
audited, and handed between replaceable workers without losing institutional
state.

Follows the OpenPRD/OpenOntology pattern already in the repo: self-contained
JSON Schemas in @logicsrc/schemas, a reference implementation package, CLI
subcommands, docs, examples, and an OpenPRD record.

Schemas (8, all self-contained so a third party can fetch one file and
validate against it with no further resolution):
  manifest, object, bundle, role, provenance, decision, diagnostic,
  audit-event — registered in @logicsrc/validators and schemas:validate.

Reference implementation (@logicsrc/opencontext):
  loader with upward manifest discovery, the full resolution pipeline,
  authority/supersession, permissions, redaction, lifecycle, provenance,
  deterministic digests, doctor, search, graph, history/diff, guarded writes,
  audit events, and file/http/git/sqlite adapters.

CLI: all 15 specified commands, as a standalone `opencontext` binary and as
`logicsrc context`, sharing one implementation so the two cannot drift.

Design decisions worth noting:

- Supersession is declared, never inferred from version numbers. Inferring it
  would hide the governance failure it represents and make
  multiple-active-versions and duplicate-canonical impossible to detect.

- The bundle digest identifies the resolved context, not the moment it was
  computed, so generated_at/bundle_id/digest/as_of are excluded while objects,
  lifecycle states, exclusions and warnings are covered. That is what lets a
  decision record cite exactly the context that produced it.

- A role's own max_classification beats an inherited one, so a ceiling on a
  shared base role cannot silently cap a role deliberately granted more;
  requesting several roles at once still takes the lowest, so combining roles
  never escalates.

- Scope wildcards match whole dotted segments only. A trailing .* covers a
  subtree; an interior * matches exactly one segment. Substring matching here
  would be an access-control bug.

- --include narrows an existing scope and is applied after it, never merged
  into it, so a request can never widen what a role holds.

Verified: 226 tests across core primitives, permissions/redaction, the
resolution pipeline, security, the published conformance fixtures (13 valid,
35 invalid, 8 resolution scenarios), project behaviour, and the five shipped
examples — which are held to --strict and a 100% health score. Benchmarks meet
every published budget (resolve 1,000 objects in ~33ms against a 2s target).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Point install docs at @logicsrc/opencontext; record the npm name collision

The unscoped `opencontext` name is already published on npm by an unrelated
third party (federicodeponte/opencontext, 2.0.0), so `npx opencontext` would
install a stranger's package. Docs now use `npx @logicsrc/opencontext`; the bin
stays named `opencontext` so the command reads as the PRD specifies once
installed.

Recorded in PRD 0003 as a blocker to resolve before any publication, along with
the fact that no @logicsrc spec package has ever been published, so there is no
existing release path to slot into.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Advance the logicsrc-mcp next-PRD-id assertion to 0004

standards.test.ts asserts prd_next_id against the live prd/ directory, so
adding PRD 0003 makes the next free id 0004. The test's own comment
anticipates this: "advances with every PRD added".

Caught by CI, not locally — the earlier verification ran per-package tests for
the packages this branch touches, and logicsrc-mcp is coupled to the PRD
directory without importing from it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-09 11:46:11 -07:00

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4.8 KiB
JSON

{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"$id": "https://logicsrc.com/schemas/opencontext/role.schema.json",
"title": "OpenContext Role / Scope",
"description": "A named scope: the authorized subset of context available to a human, role, agent, task, or runtime. Roles answer 'may this consumer read it', which OpenContext keeps strictly separate from 'is it relevant'. Exclusions and denials are applied before relevance ranking, so unauthorized context never reaches a ranker, a prompt, or a bundle. This schema governs a single role; the manifest embeds the same shape under its roles map.",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"properties": {
"id": {
"type": "string",
"pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]*$",
"description": "Role name. Optional when the role is embedded in a manifest, where the map key names it."
},
"description": {
"type": "string",
"description": "What this role is for, in one line."
},
"include": {
"type": "array",
"uniqueItems": true,
"items": { "$ref": "#/$defs/pattern" },
"description": "Id patterns in scope, e.g. mission, products.*, policies.support.*. A role with no include list sees nothing: scope is opt-in, never opt-out."
},
"exclude": {
"type": "array",
"uniqueItems": true,
"items": { "$ref": "#/$defs/pattern" },
"description": "Id patterns denied to this role. Deny overrides allow unconditionally — an exclusion cannot be outvoted by a more specific include, by inheritance, or by an object-level read grant."
},
"permissions": {
"type": "array",
"uniqueItems": true,
"items": { "type": "string", "minLength": 1 },
"description": "Capability strings such as customer.read or ticket.write. OpenContext transports and scopes these so a runtime can enforce them; OpenContext does not itself perform your application's actions."
},
"max_classification": {
"$ref": "#/$defs/classification",
"description": "Highest classification this role may read. An object above the ceiling is denied even when an include pattern matches it. Defaults to internal, so confidential and restricted context requires an explicit grant."
},
"redact": {
"type": "array",
"description": "Redaction rules applied to everything this role reads, unioned with repository-wide and object-level rules.",
"items": { "$ref": "#/$defs/redaction" }
},
"inherits": {
"type": "array",
"uniqueItems": true,
"items": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]*$" },
"description": "Roles whose scope merges into this one. Includes, excludes, and redactions all union, and the classification ceiling takes the lowest of the parents — inheritance can therefore only narrow what is readable, never widen it. Cycles are a validation error."
},
"extensions": { "$ref": "#/$defs/extensions" }
},
"$defs": {
"pattern": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"pattern": "^([a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]*|\\*)(\\.([a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]*|\\*))*$",
"description": "An exact object id (policy.refunds), a trailing wildcard covering a subtree (policies.support.*), an interior wildcard matching exactly one segment (customers.*.churn-risk), or * for everything. Wildcards always match whole dotted segments, never substrings, so products.* matches products.enterprise but never products-internal."
},
"classification": {
"type": "string",
"enum": ["public", "internal", "confidential", "restricted"],
"description": "Sensitivity band, least to most sensitive."
},
"redaction": {
"type": "object",
"required": ["path"],
"additionalProperties": false,
"description": "A rule removing or masking part of an object's structured content before it reaches a bundle.",
"properties": {
"path": {
"type": "string",
"minLength": 1,
"description": "Dotted path into the object's content, with [] or [*] for every element of an array, e.g. customer.ssn or contacts[*].email."
},
"mode": {
"type": "string",
"enum": ["remove", "mask", "hash"],
"default": "remove",
"description": "remove deletes the key; mask replaces the value with the replacement string; hash replaces it with a sha256 digest so equality remains testable without disclosure."
},
"replacement": { "type": "string", "default": "[REDACTED]" },
"reason": { "type": "string", "description": "Why the field is redacted. Surfaced in --explain." }
}
},
"extensions": {
"type": "object",
"description": "Namespaced custom fields, e.g. com.example.risk.",
"propertyNames": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^[a-z0-9]+(\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+$" },
"additionalProperties": true
}
}
}