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18 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
6f23dbdb0f
feat(credentials): re-key team vaults, and reach sh1pt's vault as a provider (#117)
Two additions to Credential Sharing.

`logicsrc credentials rotate` (alias `logicsrc secrets rotate`) re-keys a
team vault: fresh DEK, re-sealed to the members who keep access, every
secret re-encrypted under it. Values do not change, so nothing that
consumes them breaks; what changes is that every wrapped key issued
before the rotation is dead. --active (the default) keeps only active
members and revokes the rest -- the "someone left" rotation. --all keeps
everyone who holds access, for plain hygiene. Dry run by default, like
`sync`.

The DEK is recoverable ONLY through the grants, so a half-applied
rotation makes a vault permanently unreadable by everyone. The whole next
state therefore goes to the server in one request and commits in one
transaction (new db.batch helper). The server also requires every
submitted fingerprint to equal the stored one: it cannot see values, but
it can prove a re-key did not swap any. Rotations that would leave the
caller ungranted, grant nobody, or cover the wrong secret count are
rejected before anything is written. GET /vaults/:id/grants now returns
publicKey and status so a client can re-seal in one pass instead of N+1
user lookups, and revocation finally deletes the grant row rather than
leaving one that reports access it no longer confers.

The sh1pt adapter is the fifth provider. It is the only one driven
through a CLI rather than HTTP, because sh1pt publishes
`sh1pt secret set|get|list|rm` as the interface to its vault and
documents no REST endpoint. Values go over the child's stdin, never argv
-- a secret in argv is readable by any user on the host via ps. Since
`sh1pt secret get` needs interactive confirmation it cannot be scripted,
so the adapter is write-only for values like github-secrets: a sync
target, never a source, no value-restoring rollback.

Tests drive a real fake sh1pt binary rather than a mocked execFile, which
is how the hang surfaced: with nothing to pipe, stdin was left open and
any subcommand that reads it would wait forever. It is now always closed.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-30 18:41:03 -07:00
7c9796ae51
fix(cli): default logicsrc login to app.logicsrc.com (#107)
The default was the apex, which runs the marketing app -- so every path the CLI
needs (/cli/device/code, /cli/device/token, /cli/authorize, /cli/token,
/api/me) returns 404 there. Point it at the host that actually serves them.

app.logicsrc.com is now a custom domain on the credentials service with a valid
certificate, verified live: /cli/device/code returns 200 and issues a real user
code, /api/me returns 401 rather than 404, which is routing working correctly
for an unauthenticated request.

The apex can forward these paths instead -- that is what the rewrites in
apps/logicsrc-web/next.config.ts do -- but that needs a second service deployed
to be true, while this needs nothing beyond the domain that already exists. The
rewrites stay useful as a convenience; they are no longer load-bearing.

$LOGICSRC_API still overrides, unchanged.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-30 11:07:49 -07:00
0510d86f85
fix(cli): default logicsrc login to logicsrc.com (#104)
The default API origin was the generated Railway hostname
(logicsrc-credentials-production.up.railway.app), which leaked deployment
infrastructure into every login prompt and stored identity. Point it at the
production domain instead.

NOTE: logicsrc.com does not currently serve the credentials app's CLI routes —
/cli/device/code, /cli/device/token, /cli/authorize, /cli/token, and /api/me
live in apps/pwa (src/routes/cli.mjs), while the apex serves apps/logicsrc-web.
At time of writing all of those return 404 on logicsrc.com and 200 on the
Railway origin, so login will fail until the apex (or a subdomain) is pointed
at the pwa service. $LOGICSRC_API overrides the default in the meantime.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-30 07:23:36 -07:00
cf475f0f4c fix(cli): point logicsrc login at the real app + add device-code login
Some checks are pending
CI / build (push) Waiting to run
test / test (push) Waiting to run
`logicsrc login` defaulted to http://localhost:4010 — a dev origin that
doesn't exist on an installed machine, so the printed authorize URL went
nowhere. It now defaults to the hosted credentials app (apps/pwa), reads
the documented $LOGICSRC_API, and only reuses a stored apiUrl once that
identity has actually completed a login (which is how machines got stuck
pointing at localhost). Note logicsrc.com is the marketing site and has
no /cli routes.

The loopback flow is also unusable over SSH: redirect_uri is
http://127.0.0.1:<port>/callback, which resolves to the *browser's*
machine, not the CLI's. Added a device-authorization flow — the CLI
prints a short user_code, the human approves it from any browser:

  POST /cli/device/code   mint device_code + user_code (10 min TTL)
  GET  /cli/device        approve page (login required; typo-tolerant)
  POST /cli/device        approve/deny (CSRF-guarded browser form)
  POST /cli/device/token  CLI polls -> lsk_ API key

device_code is stored sha256-hashed, single-use, with authorization_pending
/ slow_down / access_denied / expired_token poll semantics. The CLI picks
the flow automatically (SSH/CI/no-DISPLAY -> device), with --device/--web
to force it and a fallback to loopback against servers without /cli/device.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 18:07:49 +00:00
f057589d66 feat(credential-sharing): end-to-end-encrypted team credential sharing
Adds a `team` credential provider + team/member management so teammates can
share secrets by email instead of passing .env files over chat. Fully E2E:
the server only ever stores ciphertext, per-member sealed vault keys, and
public keys — it never sees a plaintext value or the vault DEK.

Plugin (@logicsrc/plugin-credential-sharing)
- crypto.ts: X25519 identity keys, per-vault DEK (secretbox), DEK sealed to
  each member's pubkey (crypto_box_seal), value encrypt/decrypt (libsodium)
- identity.ts: local ~/.logicsrc/identity.json (0600) holding the device key
  + API token; never uploads the secret key
- client.ts: typed /api/credshare client
- providers/team.ts: `team:<slug>/<vault>` CredentialProvider (inspect,
  readValues=decrypt, write=encrypt, rollback); fingerprints match env so
  env<->team diffs line up
- fixes latent libsodium-wrappers ESM load bug (createRequire) here + in
  github-secrets

Server (commandboard-api /api/credshare)
- zero-knowledge router: email-code auth, keys, teams, members, invites,
  vaults, sealed grants, ciphertext secrets, audit; membership authz in app
- CredShareStore abstraction: in-memory (dev/tests) + Supabase (prod)
- Resend email transport for login codes + invites (no-op -> echoes locally)
- supabase migration: credshare_* tables, deny-by-default RLS

CLI
- real `logicsrc login` (email code -> token + key upload)
- `logicsrc teams create/list/invite/accept/members/vaults/grant/push/pull`

Web (logicsrc.com/teams + /teams/accept)
- management surface only (browser holds no private key, never decrypts):
  login, view teams/members/vaults, invite, accept

Tests: crypto round-trip, server contract (invite->accept->push->grant->pull
+ authz boundaries), and a real HTTP+client+crypto E2E asserting the server
never holds plaintext. Full workspace build + tests green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-13 13:11:32 +00:00
RissRIce
c495041adb
fix(feed-discovery): block reserved feed IP targets (#88)
Co-authored-by: jsdavid278-cyber <jsdavid278-cyber@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-01 01:12:10 -07:00
cf73fe5af2 feat(credential-sharing): implement the Credential Sharing OpenSpec (M1-M3)
New @logicsrc/plugin-credential-sharing: a provider-neutral secret-sync engine
with env/.env, Doppler, Railway, and GitHub Secrets adapters behind one
CredentialProvider contract.

- engine: inspect -> diff -> plan -> approve -> sync -> rollback -> audit/export
- dry-run is the default for sync; --approve writes; destructive changes gated
- fingerprint-based diffs (salted SHA-256); raw values never printed or stored in
  plans/runs/audit; rollback pre-image kept in a 0600 .logicsrc vault (gitignored)
- github-secrets is write-only for values (sealed-box via libsodium), so it cannot
  be a sync source or value-restoring rollback target
- CLI: real `logicsrc credentials <providers|inspect|diff|plan|approve|sync|
  rollback|audit|export>` (replaces the prior stub)
- 4 JSON schemas registered in @logicsrc/validators
- flip logicsrc.com/credential-sharing band from coming-soon to available
- 37 tests pass; full env->env lifecycle verified; artifacts schema-validate

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-27 15:24:30 +00:00
e304eac761 Add AgentMail plugin: paid-member mailbox client for humans + agents
@logicsrc/plugin-agentmail provides read/search/compose/send/flag/delete
over an injected MailTransport, gated to Founding Lifetime (paid) members.
Returns plain JSON-serializable domain objects so the same API serves a
human TUI, the CLI, MCP, and bots.

- domain.ts: transport-agnostic types + pure helpers (parse/format address,
  normalizeDraft, isValidEmail, snippet)
- ports.ts: MailTransport seam
- service.ts: AgentMailService (inbox/list/read/search/send/reply/flag/delete)
- access.ts: paid-member gate (assertPaid) + capability constants
- transports/memory.ts: complete in-memory backend (tests/dev/reference)
- transports/mailu.ts: self-hosted Mailu seam (mail.profullstack.com IMAP +
  smtp.profullstack.com submission) with injected IMAP/SMTP drivers
- index.ts: PluginDefinition (manifest, routes, capabilities, tuiPanels)
- registered in the root build; 20 vitest tests pass

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-14 15:37:17 +00:00
bf046ae280 Add AgentGit M1: agent-native git layer over a Forgejo backend
AgentGit is a thin, DID-gated source-collaboration layer over a backend
forge (default Forgejo at git.profullstack.com, BBS-members-only) — not a
new git host. M1 implements the contract and engines:

- forge/adapter.ts: ForgeAdapter interface (only forge-specific surface)
- forge/forgejo.ts: ForgejoAdapter over Forgejo/Gitea REST v1 (injectable
  fetch, typed errors), incl. ensureUser for member provisioning
- access.ts: gateAccess DID membership gate (owner/role/visibility)
- merge-policy.ts: evaluateMergePolicy pure engine (reviews, reputation
  floor, checks, escrow, merge method, agent-merge toggle)
- service.ts: AgentGitService ties gate + policy to the adapter; refuses
  policy-failing merges; provisionMember hook for AgentBBS
- schemas: logicsrc-repo + logicsrc-pull-request, registered in
  @logicsrc/validators with fixtures
- docs/agentgit.md spec; plugin wired into root build (default/disabled)

27 vitest tests pass; full monorepo build green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-14 15:15:06 +00:00
Autowebassat-blip
774d461db6
Block IPv4-compatible IPv6 feed URLs (#32)
Co-authored-by: Codex Microtask Operator <codex-microtask@example.com>
2026-06-13 22:58:57 -07:00
Autowebassat-blip
ffefd364ce
Ignore malformed feed probe candidates (#43)
Co-authored-by: Codex Microtask Operator <codex-microtask@example.com>
2026-06-13 22:55:39 -07:00
RissRIce
aa3fdba277
Detect podcast RSS item enclosures (#50) 2026-06-13 22:55:06 -07:00
lazyGPT07
be530ab687
fix(feeds): enforce freshness window (#52) 2026-06-13 22:54:53 -07:00
Autowebassat-blip
73e2464b30
Block IPv6 unspecified feed URLs (#15) 2026-06-11 21:06:03 -07:00
c23ce42948 Add communication account plugin scaffolds 2026-06-09 10:02:07 +00:00
5cfeea6b57 Add feed discovery plugin 2026-06-09 09:34:31 +00:00
b1d8fe475a feat: add c0mpute plugin and hire-us request flow 2026-06-06 19:42:00 +00:00
5c9ea821f6 Scaffold LogicSRC and CommandBoard plugins 2026-06-06 11:24:02 +00:00