Add the LogicSRC OpenContext specification (#132)

* Add the LogicSRC OpenContext specification

OpenContext is an open specification for durable, portable, permissioned,
provenance-aware context shared between humans and AI agents. It defines how
organizational knowledge is described, authorized, versioned, resolved,
audited, and handed between replaceable workers without losing institutional
state.

Follows the OpenPRD/OpenOntology pattern already in the repo: self-contained
JSON Schemas in @logicsrc/schemas, a reference implementation package, CLI
subcommands, docs, examples, and an OpenPRD record.

Schemas (8, all self-contained so a third party can fetch one file and
validate against it with no further resolution):
  manifest, object, bundle, role, provenance, decision, diagnostic,
  audit-event — registered in @logicsrc/validators and schemas:validate.

Reference implementation (@logicsrc/opencontext):
  loader with upward manifest discovery, the full resolution pipeline,
  authority/supersession, permissions, redaction, lifecycle, provenance,
  deterministic digests, doctor, search, graph, history/diff, guarded writes,
  audit events, and file/http/git/sqlite adapters.

CLI: all 15 specified commands, as a standalone `opencontext` binary and as
`logicsrc context`, sharing one implementation so the two cannot drift.

Design decisions worth noting:

- Supersession is declared, never inferred from version numbers. Inferring it
  would hide the governance failure it represents and make
  multiple-active-versions and duplicate-canonical impossible to detect.

- The bundle digest identifies the resolved context, not the moment it was
  computed, so generated_at/bundle_id/digest/as_of are excluded while objects,
  lifecycle states, exclusions and warnings are covered. That is what lets a
  decision record cite exactly the context that produced it.

- A role's own max_classification beats an inherited one, so a ceiling on a
  shared base role cannot silently cap a role deliberately granted more;
  requesting several roles at once still takes the lowest, so combining roles
  never escalates.

- Scope wildcards match whole dotted segments only. A trailing .* covers a
  subtree; an interior * matches exactly one segment. Substring matching here
  would be an access-control bug.

- --include narrows an existing scope and is applied after it, never merged
  into it, so a request can never widen what a role holds.

Verified: 226 tests across core primitives, permissions/redaction, the
resolution pipeline, security, the published conformance fixtures (13 valid,
35 invalid, 8 resolution scenarios), project behaviour, and the five shipped
examples — which are held to --strict and a 100% health score. Benchmarks meet
every published budget (resolve 1,000 objects in ~33ms against a 2s target).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Point install docs at @logicsrc/opencontext; record the npm name collision

The unscoped `opencontext` name is already published on npm by an unrelated
third party (federicodeponte/opencontext, 2.0.0), so `npx opencontext` would
install a stranger's package. Docs now use `npx @logicsrc/opencontext`; the bin
stays named `opencontext` so the command reads as the PRD specifies once
installed.

Recorded in PRD 0003 as a blocker to resolve before any publication, along with
the fact that no @logicsrc spec package has ever been published, so there is no
existing release path to slot into.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Advance the logicsrc-mcp next-PRD-id assertion to 0004

standards.test.ts asserts prd_next_id against the live prd/ directory, so
adding PRD 0003 makes the next free id 0004. The test's own comment
anticipates this: "advances with every PRD added".

Caught by CI, not locally — the earlier verification ran per-package tests for
the packages this branch touches, and logicsrc-mcp is coupled to the PRD
directory without importing from it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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# Multi-agent company
One shared context repository. Five agents. Five different bundles.
```bash
opencontext validate --strict
opencontext doctor
for agent in sales-agent support-agent dev-agent finance-agent ops-agent; do
echo "== $agent"
opencontext resolve --agent "$agent" --explain
done
```
## What each agent gets
| Agent | Sees | Never sees |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `sales-agent` | products, customers, pricing, quoting SOP | churn risk, payroll, architecture |
| `support-agent` | products, customers, refunds, refund SOP | pricing, payroll, architecture |
| `dev-agent` | architecture, change management, decisions | customers, pricing, payroll |
| `finance-agent` | every policy including payroll, customers | architecture, runbooks, card numbers |
| `ops-agent` | procedures, runbooks, change management | customers, pricing, payroll |
## Three mechanisms doing the work
**Scope.** Each role includes only what it needs. `sales` additionally excludes
`customers.*.churn-risk`, so an inferred model score cannot leak into a customer
conversation even though `customers.*` matches it.
**Classification.** `policies.payroll` is `confidential`. Only `finance`
declares `max_classification: confidential`; every other role falls back to
`internal` and is refused. A role's own declaration wins over the one it
inherits, so a ceiling on a shared base role cannot silently cap a role that was
deliberately granted more — while requesting several roles at once still takes
the lowest of them, so combining roles never escalates.
**Redaction.** The manifest redacts `payment.card` repository-wide, so no role —
including `finance` — ever receives a card number, even from a record it is
fully entitled to read.
**Object permissions.** `policies.payroll` also carries
`permissions.read: [finance]`, so it is refused even to a role whose include
pattern matches it. Deny overrides allow, at every level.
## The point
Replace `support-agent` with a different model tomorrow. Run the same command.
The bundle is identical, and its digest proves it. The agent was replaceable;
the context was not.

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{
"id": "customers.acme",
"type": "customer",
"layer": "L2",
"title": "ACME Manufacturing",
"authority": "reference",
"owner": "sales",
"durability": "operational",
"classification": "internal",
"canonical_source": true,
"updated": "2026-08-01T00:00:00Z",
"tags": [
"customer"
],
"content": {
"name": "ACME Manufacturing",
"plan": "enterprise",
"lanes": 34,
"payment": {
"card": "4111111111111111",
"terms": "net-30"
},
"contacts": [
{
"name": "Dana Okafor",
"role": "ops",
"email": "dana@acme.example"
}
]
}
}

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---
id: customers.acme.churn-risk
type: knowledge
layer: L2
title: ACME churn risk
authority: inferred
owner: finance
confidence: 0.6
durability: operational
classification: confidential
canonical_source: true
updated: 2026-08-01T00:00:00Z
tags: [churn, internal]
---
Model scores ACME at elevated churn risk after two late renewals.
`authority: inferred` and `confidence: 0.6` — this is a model's opinion, not
a fact, and it never outranks anything canonical. It is excluded from the
sales scope outright so it cannot leak into a customer conversation.

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---
id: decisions.2026-08-01-agent-roles
type: decision
layer: L5
title: Give every agent a role, never a bespoke prompt
authority: approved
owner: founders
status: accepted
durability: permanent
classification: internal
canonical_source: true
created: 2026-08-01T00:00:00Z
updated: 2026-08-01T00:00:00Z
decision: Every agent is onboarded by assigning it a role in opencontext.yaml.
rationale:
- A bespoke prompt per agent is context that only exists inside that agent.
- Roles make offboarding a one-line revocation instead of an investigation.
- Two agents in the same role provably receive the same context.
alternatives:
- option: Hand-written system prompts per agent
rejected_because: The organization's knowledge ends up inside vendors we do not control.
consequences:
- Adding an agent means editing the manifest, which is reviewed like code.
approved_by:
- role: founders
at: 2026-08-01T00:00:00Z
references: [organization]
tags: [governance, agents]
---
This is the decision that makes the rest of the repository worth maintaining.

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---
id: glossary
type: glossary
layer: L1
title: Terminology
authority: canonical
owner: founders
durability: long-lived
classification: internal
canonical_source: true
updated: 2026-08-01T00:00:00Z
---
- **Lane** — an origin/destination pair we quote and track on.
- **Tender** — an offer of a shipment to a carrier.
- **Churn risk** — an internal score. Never shown or hinted to a customer.

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---
id: knowledge.architecture
type: knowledge
layer: L2
title: System architecture
authority: canonical
owner: platform
durability: long-lived
classification: internal
canonical_source: true
updated: 2026-08-01T00:00:00Z
tags: [architecture]
---
Ingest normalises carrier feeds. Core holds shipment state. Alerts is a
stateless evaluator over Core.
Only Core writes to the database.

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---
id: knowledge.runbooks
type: knowledge
layer: L2
title: Runbook index
authority: approved
owner: operations
durability: operational
classification: internal
canonical_source: true
updated: 2026-08-01T00:00:00Z
references: [procedures.deploy]
tags: [runbook]
---
- Carrier feed stalled → replay from the last checkpoint.
- Alert storm → damp the evaluator before touching Core.

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---
id: mission
type: mission
layer: L0
title: Why Meridian exists
authority: canonical
owner: founders
durability: permanent
classification: public
canonical_source: true
updated: 2026-08-01T00:00:00Z
---
Give mid-sized manufacturers the supply-chain visibility that used to require
an enterprise contract and a consulting engagement.

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---
id: organization
type: identity
layer: L1
title: How Meridian is organized
authority: canonical
owner: founders
durability: long-lived
classification: internal
canonical_source: true
updated: 2026-08-01T00:00:00Z
---
Five functions, each with a human lead and at least one agent:
sales, support, engineering, finance, and operations.
Agents are execution capacity. They are onboarded by being pointed at this
repository, and offboarded by revoking a role. Nothing they learned in the
course of working leaves with them, because anything worth keeping was
written here.

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---
id: policies.change-management
type: policy
layer: L3
title: Change management
authority: canonical
owner: cto
status: approved
durability: long-lived
classification: internal
canonical_source: true
updated: 2026-08-01T00:00:00Z
tags: [process]
applies_to: [engineering, operations]
---
Production changes need a reviewed pull request and a rollback plan.
Migrations are additive first.

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---
id: policies.payroll
type: policy
layer: L3
title: Payroll
authority: canonical
owner: finance
status: approved
durability: long-lived
classification: confidential
canonical_source: true
updated: 2026-08-01T00:00:00Z
permissions:
read: [finance]
tags: [finance]
---
Payroll runs on the 25th.
Confidential, and additionally restricted with an object-level read grant —
so even a role whose include pattern matches `policies.*` is refused.

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---
id: policies.pricing
type: policy
layer: L3
title: Pricing
authority: canonical
owner: finance
status: approved
durability: long-lived
classification: internal
canonical_source: true
updated: 2026-08-01T00:00:00Z
tags: [pricing]
applies_to: [sales, finance]
---
Visibility starts at $2,500/month for 25 lanes; additional lanes are $95 each.
Discounts above 15% require finance approval.

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---
id: policies.refunds
type: policy
layer: L3
title: Refund policy
authority: canonical
owner: support
status: approved
durability: long-lived
classification: internal
canonical_source: true
updated: 2026-08-01T00:00:00Z
tags: [refunds]
applies_to: [support]
---
Refunds are accepted within 30 days. Enterprise accounts on net-30 terms are
credited against the next invoice rather than refunded.

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---
id: products.visibility
type: product
layer: L2
title: Meridian Visibility
authority: canonical
owner: product
durability: long-lived
classification: internal
canonical_source: true
updated: 2026-08-01T00:00:00Z
tags: [product]
---
Tracks shipments across carriers and raises an alert when one will miss its
window.
It does not book freight and does not clear customs. Decline both rather
than improvising an answer.

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---
id: procedures.deploy
type: procedure
layer: L4
title: How to deploy
authority: approved
owner: operations
status: approved
durability: operational
classification: internal
canonical_source: true
updated: 2026-08-01T00:00:00Z
references: [policies.change-management]
applies_to: [operations]
---
1. Confirm the rollback plan exists before starting.
2. Deploy to one region, watch error rates for ten minutes, then continue.
3. Roll back rather than roll forward.

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---
id: procedures.quote
type: procedure
layer: L4
title: How to produce a quote
authority: approved
owner: sales
status: approved
durability: operational
classification: internal
canonical_source: true
updated: 2026-08-01T00:00:00Z
references: [policies.pricing, products.visibility]
applies_to: [sales]
---
1. Confirm lane count and contract length.
2. Apply list pricing.
3. Above 15% off, stop and escalate to finance.

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---
id: procedures.refund
type: procedure
layer: L4
title: How to process a refund
authority: approved
owner: support
status: approved
durability: operational
classification: internal
canonical_source: true
updated: 2026-08-01T00:00:00Z
references: [policies.refunds]
applies_to: [support]
---
1. Check the purchase date against the refund policy.
2. Enterprise accounts are credited, not refunded.
3. Outside the window, escalate.

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# One shared context repository, five agents, five different bundles.
#
# This is the whole thesis in one file: the organization's knowledge lives
# here, and the agents are interchangeable readers of it. Replace any of
# them tomorrow and nothing below changes.
opencontext: "1.0"
id: meridian
name: Meridian
context:
mission: ./context/mission.md
organization: ./context/organization.md
glossary: ./context/glossary.md
collections:
products: ./context/products/**
customers: ./context/customers/**
policies: ./context/policies/**
procedures: ./context/sops/**
decisions: ./context/decisions/**
knowledge: ./context/knowledge/**
roles:
# Everything every worker needs, human or agent. Everyone inherits it.
everyone:
description: Shared identity and terminology.
include:
- mission
- organization
- glossary
max_classification: internal
sales:
inherits: [everyone]
include:
- products.*
- customers.*
- policies.pricing
- procedures.quote
exclude:
- customers.*.churn-risk
permissions:
- quote.create
- customer.read
redact:
- path: payment.card
mode: mask
support:
inherits: [everyone]
include:
- products.*
- customers.*
- policies.refunds
- procedures.refund
permissions:
- ticket.write
- customer.read
redact:
- path: payment.card
mode: mask
- path: contacts[*].email
mode: hash
engineering:
inherits: [everyone]
include:
- products.*
- knowledge.*
- policies.change-management
- decisions.*
permissions:
- repo.write
finance:
inherits: [everyone]
include:
- policies.*
- customers.*
permissions:
- invoice.write
max_classification: confidential
operations:
inherits: [everyone]
include:
- procedures.*
- knowledge.runbooks
- policies.change-management
permissions:
- deploy.production
agents:
sales-agent:
roles: [sales]
support-agent:
roles: [support]
dev-agent:
roles: [engineering]
finance-agent:
roles: [finance]
ops-agent:
roles: [operations]
# Repository-wide redaction, applied to every role including finance.
# A raw card number has no business in a context bundle at all, so this is
# stated once here rather than repeated in each role that might read it.
redact:
- path: payment.card
mode: mask
replacement: "[REDACTED]"
reason: PAN is never needed to answer a question about an account
authority:
precedence:
- canonical
- approved
- reference
- observed
- inferred
- historical
freshness:
default_ttl: 365d
provenance:
required: true
audit:
context_reads: true
context_writes: true
decisions: true
health:
minimum_score: 90
require_owner: true