agentbbs/.github/threatcrush-to-sarif.py
Anthony Ettinger 595eec118b
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ci: add ThreatCrush security scan (#105)
Installs threatcrush-scan@1.1.0 from the sh1pt Actions Store.
Scans pull requests for hardcoded credentials, injection, SSRF, unsafe
deserialisation and dependency tampering; uploads SARIF to the Security
tab.

Report-only — it will not fail a pull request. Set the pack's failOn
input to critical,high once the existing findings are triaged.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-03 07:21:39 -07:00

210 lines
7.9 KiB
Python

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Convert ThreatCrush terminal output to SARIF 2.1.0.
Compatibility shim for CLI versions older than native ``--format sarif``.
When the CLI can emit SARIF itself the workflow uses that and never runs this
file; parsing a human-readable stream is strictly worse and exists only so a
repository is not left unscanned while waiting for a release.
It **fails closed**. If it cannot recognise the output it exits non-zero and
dumps what it saw. Emitting empty SARIF instead would report "0 findings",
which is indistinguishable from a clean scan and is the single most expensive
thing a security tool can get wrong.
Three details of the format, each of which is load-bearing:
* Severity is bare for ``CRITICAL`` and bracketed for ``[HIGH]``/``[MEDIUM]``/
``[LOW]``. One regex shape misses half the findings.
* ``File:`` paths are relative to the scan root, not the repository root. Left
unprefixed, every finding resolves to nothing in the consumer's view of the
repo. Hence ``--path-prefix``.
* Whole-file findings report line ``:0``. SARIF requires ``startLine >= 1``.
``Code:`` lines are redacted excerpts of the match. They are skipped rather
than parsed, both because matching them would double-count every finding and
because a redacted excerpt tells a reader nothing the ``Info:`` line does not.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import json
import re
import sys
ANSI = re.compile(r"\x1b\[[0-9;]*[A-Za-z]")
# ` CRITICAL AWS Access Key` / ` [HIGH] Sensitive File`
SEVERITY_LINE = re.compile(r"^\s*(?:\[(CRITICAL|HIGH|MEDIUM|LOW|INFO)\]|(CRITICAL))\s+(.+?)\s*$")
FILE_LINE = re.compile(r"^\s*File:\s*(.+?):(\d+)\s*$")
INFO_LINE = re.compile(r"^\s*Info:\s*(.+?)\s*$")
# Proof that a scan ran to completion. Without one of these we are looking at a
# crash, a help screen, or an unrecognised release — never at a clean result.
FOOTER = re.compile(r"^\s*(?:\d+\s+issue\(s\)\s+found|.*No security issues found)")
LEVELS = {"CRITICAL": "error", "HIGH": "error", "MEDIUM": "warning", "LOW": "note", "INFO": "none"}
SECURITY_SEVERITY = {"CRITICAL": "9.0", "HIGH": "7.0", "MEDIUM": "5.0", "LOW": "3.0", "INFO": "1.0"}
RANK = {"info": 0, "low": 1, "medium": 2, "high": 3, "critical": 4}
class Unrecognised(Exception):
"""The output did not look like a completed ThreatCrush scan."""
def rule_id(title: str) -> str:
"""Derive a stable rule id from a finding title.
Old CLIs print `AWS Access Key`, not `secret-aws-access-key`. Slugifying
keeps SARIF results groupable and keeps fingerprints stable across runs,
which is what stops the Security tab treating every run as brand-new alerts.
"""
slug = re.sub(r"[^a-z0-9]+", "-", title.lower()).strip("-")
return f"threatcrush-{slug}" if slug else "threatcrush-finding"
def parse(text: str) -> list[dict]:
lines = ANSI.sub("", text).splitlines()
if not any(FOOTER.match(line) for line in lines):
raise Unrecognised("no scan-completion footer found")
findings: list[dict] = []
pending: dict | None = None
for line in lines:
severity_match = SEVERITY_LINE.match(line)
if severity_match:
severity = severity_match.group(1) or severity_match.group(2)
pending = {"severity": severity.upper(), "title": severity_match.group(3).strip()}
continue
if pending is None:
continue
file_match = FILE_LINE.match(line)
if file_match:
pending["file"] = file_match.group(1).strip()
pending["line"] = int(file_match.group(2))
continue
info_match = INFO_LINE.match(line)
if info_match and "file" in pending:
pending["message"] = info_match.group(1).strip()
findings.append(pending)
pending = None
return findings
def to_sarif(findings: list[dict], prefix: str, version: str) -> dict:
rules: dict[str, dict] = {}
results = []
for finding in findings:
rid = rule_id(finding["title"])
rules.setdefault(
rid,
{
"id": rid,
"name": rid,
"shortDescription": {"text": finding["title"]},
"fullDescription": {"text": finding["title"]},
"defaultConfiguration": {"level": LEVELS[finding["severity"]]},
"properties": {
"tags": ["security", "threatcrush"],
"security-severity": SECURITY_SEVERITY[finding["severity"]],
},
},
)
uri = finding["file"].lstrip("./")
if prefix:
uri = f"{prefix.strip('/')}/{uri}"
results.append(
{
"ruleId": rid,
"level": LEVELS[finding["severity"]],
"message": {"text": finding.get("message", finding["title"])},
"locations": [
{
"physicalLocation": {
"artifactLocation": {"uri": uri, "uriBaseId": "%SRCROOT%"},
# Clamped: SARIF rejects 0, and a whole-file finding
# has no line to report.
"region": {"startLine": max(1, finding["line"])},
}
}
],
"partialFingerprints": {
"primaryLocationLineHash": f"{rid}:{uri}:{max(1, finding['line'])}"
},
"properties": {"severity": finding["severity"].lower()},
}
)
return {
"$schema": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/oasis-tcs/sarif-spec/master/Schemata/sarif-schema-2.1.0.json",
"version": "2.1.0",
"runs": [
{
"tool": {
"driver": {
"name": "ThreatCrush",
"version": version,
"informationUri": "https://threatcrush.com",
"rules": list(rules.values()),
}
},
"results": results,
"columnKind": "utf16CodeUnits",
}
],
}
def main() -> int:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__)
parser.add_argument("--input", required=True, help="captured `threatcrush scan` output")
parser.add_argument("--output", required=True, help="SARIF file to write")
parser.add_argument("--path-prefix", default="", help="prepended to every file URI")
parser.add_argument("--tool-version", default="unknown")
parser.add_argument("--fail-on", default="", help="comma-separated severities that exit 1")
args = parser.parse_args()
with open(args.input, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace") as handle:
text = handle.read()
try:
findings = parse(text)
except Unrecognised as err:
print(f"error: unrecognised ThreatCrush output ({err})", file=sys.stderr)
print("--- first 40 lines ---", file=sys.stderr)
for line in ANSI.sub("", text).splitlines()[:40]:
print(line, file=sys.stderr)
return 2
with open(args.output, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
json.dump(to_sarif(findings, args.path_prefix, args.tool_version), handle, indent=2)
handle.write("\n")
print(f"converted {len(findings)} finding(s) to {args.output}")
thresholds = [s.strip().lower() for s in args.fail_on.split(",") if s.strip()]
if thresholds:
unknown = [s for s in thresholds if s not in RANK]
if unknown:
# Silently ignoring a typo produces a gate that never fires, which
# looks exactly like a passing build.
print(f"error: unknown severity in --fail-on: {', '.join(unknown)}", file=sys.stderr)
return 2
floor = min(RANK[s] for s in thresholds)
if any(RANK[f["severity"].lower()] >= floor for f in findings):
print(f"::error::findings at or above {args.fail_on}")
return 1
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())