# Files (SFTP) — member storage AgentBBS gives every verified member file storage over **SFTP**, reachable with the same SSH key they log in with. It rides the existing `:22` listener as an SSH *subsystem*, so there is no new port and no separate account: ```bash # interactive sftp files@bbs.profullstack.com # one-shot copies (same endpoint, same key) scp report.pdf files@bbs.profullstack.com:/me/ rsync -avz ./site/ -e ssh files@bbs.profullstack.com:/me/site/ ``` The username (`files`) is conventional and ignored — **identity is your SSH key** (one key = one account, like the rest of the BBS). `scp`/`rsync` work because they tunnel over the same SSH transport. ## Who can use it **Members only — but free for every member.** Like IRC and News, file storage is gated on membership, *not* on the paid Founding Lifetime plan: - **Non-members can't connect.** A key that isn't a registered account is refused at the SFTP handshake (`this key isn't a member — register first`), and guests don't see the in-hub Files browser. - **Every verified member can connect, run, and join** — free and paid alike. There is no Premium gate anywhere in the Files path; the plan only affects unrelated perks (custom email, domains, Tor). - Operators can revoke an individual account's SFTP access (abuse response) without touching its BBS login — see the management TUI below. ## Two areas When you connect you see a virtual root with two directories: | Path | What it is | Access | |---|---|---| | `/me` | Your **private** per-user workspace | read/write, quota-limited | | `/public` | Your **own public files** area, published at `~/public` | read/write (yours); world-read anonymously | These are two **separate** areas — `/public` is a sibling of `/me`, **not** a folder inside it. `/me` stays fully private; anything you put in `/public` is published on the web at **`~/public`**. Both count toward your quota. Both areas are confined: a path that tries to escape its root (`../`, an absolute path, or a planted symlink) is rejected, and the unauthenticated web surface (below) only ever exposes `~name/public`, never your private `/me`. > files.\ is a **file server, not a website host**. Member homepages > ("sites") live on the BBS at `https:///~`; the file host's `~user` > directory links out to them but does not serve them. ## Quotas Each member has a byte quota (default **1 GiB**, set by `AGENTBBS_FILES_QUOTA_MB`). The gauge sums both of your areas — private `/me` **and** your public `/public` — and writes that would exceed it fail. Operators can set a per-user override in the management TUI. ## In-BBS browser Inside the hub, the **Files** entry opens a TUI browser for your workspace and the public area: navigate, view text files, make directories, rename, and delete, with a live usage gauge. Actual transfers happen over SFTP/scp/rsync (a PTY can't move file bytes). ## Operator management TUI Operators (the `$AGENTBBS_ADMINS` allowlist) reach the SFTP management console with: ```bash ssh sftp@bbs.profullstack.com # aliases: sftpadmin@, filesadmin@ ``` Panes (Tab to switch): - **Sessions** — live SFTP connections (user, remote, rx/tx, idle); `x` force-disconnects. - **Workspaces** — every member's usage vs. quota; `Q` sets a per-user quota, `x` revokes/restores SFTP access (the BBS login is unaffected). - **Public area** — `t` toggles members' write access; `x` removes an entry (moderation). Per PRD §9.2 the operator can inspect and act on hosted files; storage is not content-blind. ## Configuration | Var | Default | Meaning | |---|---|---| | `AGENTBBS_FILES` | `1` | enable the SFTP subsystem + Files plugin (`0` disables) | | `AGENTBBS_FILES_QUOTA_MB` | `1024` | default per-user workspace quota (MB) | | `AGENTBBS_DATA` | `./data` | storage lives under `/files/{users,public}` — private `/me` is `users/`, public `/public` is `public/` | ## Provisioning members from a public key (for external services) Normally members onboard interactively (`ssh join@`). External services that want to grant a user file storage without that flow — e.g. the TronBrowser extension store letting a publisher upload bundles — can register an account directly from an SSH **public** key (an account is just *handle + key fingerprint*): ```bash agentbbs provision-user --name acme --pubkey "ssh-ed25519 AAAA… acme@dev" # or: --pubkey-file ./id_ed25519.pub ``` It normalizes the handle with the same rules as `join@` (`SanitizeUsername`), fingerprints the key, and `EnsureUser`s the member; Files/SFTP access is then available immediately (free for all members). Output is JSON (`{ok, name, fingerprint, store_id}`); it refuses if the key already belongs to another member or the handle is taken by a different key. The publisher can then: ```bash scp dist.crx files@files.profullstack.com:/public/extensions/acme/ ``` ## The web file host (`files.`) The whole site is served by the Go file manager (`internal/files/web.go`), which Caddy reverse-proxies. **Login is optional** — it gates only your private `/me` and writes. The public surface is anonymous, read-only, and area-confined; it has no route into anyone's `/me`. | URL | Serves | Auth | |---|---|---| | `/` | A **directory of all members** — each linked to their BBS **site** and their **public files** | none | | `/~/public[/path]` | That member's own public files (`/public`) — browse + download | none | | `/~` | Redirects to `/~/public/` | none | | `/?path=…`, `/upload`, … | The authenticated manager: your `/me` and your `/public` | webmail login | Clean URLs map **1:1 to the SFTP paths**, so share links just work: ``` scp index.html files@files.profullstack.com:/public/ -> https://files.profullstack.com/~chovy/public/index.html ``` Directories render a read-only browse listing; files stream with a content type and a short (`max-age=300`) cache. Sign in (top-right link, webmail password) to manage your own files. ## Provisioning members from a public key (for external services) Normally members onboard interactively (`ssh join@`). External services that want to grant a user file storage without that flow — e.g. the TronBrowser extension store letting a publisher upload bundles — can register an account directly from an SSH **public** key (an account is just *handle + key fingerprint*): ```bash agentbbs provision-user --name acme --pubkey "ssh-ed25519 AAAA… acme@dev" # or: --pubkey-file ./id_ed25519.pub ``` It normalizes the handle with the same rules as `join@` (`SanitizeUsername`), fingerprints the key, and `EnsureUser`s the member; Files/SFTP access is then available immediately (free for all members). Output is JSON (`{ok, name, fingerprint, store_id}`); it refuses if the key already belongs to another member or the handle is taken by a different key. The publisher can then: ```bash scp dist.crx files@files.profullstack.com:/public/extensions/acme/ ``` ## Public files over HTTP (anonymous, read-only) The web file manager at `files.` requires a login even to download, which is wrong for *shared* artifacts (a `.crx` download link must work for anyone). So the `files.` Caddy site (generated by `setup.sh`) serves the shared `/public` area as **unauthenticated, read-only** static files, mapping 1:1 to the SFTP path: ``` scp x files@files.profullstack.com:/public/extensions/acme/x -> https://files.profullstack.com/public/extensions/acme/x ``` Everything outside `/public/*` still falls through to the authenticated web manager (private `/me` browsing). ## Implementation - `internal/files` — a fully virtual Go SFTP server (`github.com/pkg/sftp` + `crypto/ssh`); no OS users. - `backend.go` — service, layout, quota/usage, live-session registry, operator surface. - `fs.go` — per-session virtual filesystem: `resolve()` is the single security chokepoint (area confinement + symlink-escape guard) and the pkg/sftp request handlers. - `server.go` — the `wish.WithSubsystem("sftp", …)` handler: key auth → member session → request server, with byte metering and force-disconnect. - `tui.go` — the in-BBS member browser plugin. - `admin.go` — the operator management TUI. - Storage: `files_access` (per-user quota override + revoked flag) and `files_settings` (e.g. public-write mode) in the shared SQLite store. Security is covered by `internal/files/*_test.go`: path-traversal/confinement, symlink-escape rejection, the public-write ACL, quota enforcement, and an end-to-end run against a real SFTP client.