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2 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
e478da905f files: add per-user public /site + anonymous web surface
Add a third storage area, /site — each member's own public root, served
unauthenticated on the web at ~<name> alongside the shared /public.

Web file host (files.<host>) is no longer a login wall:
- GET /            -> directory of members' ~user sites (+ sign-in link)
- GET /~<name>/... -> anon read-only browse + clean file URLs of /site
- GET /public/...  -> anon read-only browse + clean file URLs of shared
                      area (fixes bare /public requiring login: the old
                      Caddy `handle_path /public/*` never matched /public)
Login is now optional and gates only private /me + writes. The anon
surface has no route into anyone's /me and safeJoin rejects traversal.

Usage gauge now sums the member-owned areas (/me + /site) instead of
/me alone; shared /public stays operator-managed and unmetered.

Caddy: route all of files.<host> to the Go manager. Docs + tests updated
(anon download/browse, traversal confinement, /site metering).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-26 00:49:38 +00:00
6dc94bd784 feat(files): SFTP member storage — private workspaces + shared public area + mgmt TUI
Implements M4 (Files). A fully virtual Go SFTP server (pkg/sftp + crypto/ssh,
no OS users) wired as an "sftp" subsystem on the existing :22 wish listener, so
members reach their files with their login key:

    sftp files@bbs.profullstack.com     # scp/rsync ride the same endpoint

Identity is the SSH key (the username is conventional/ignored). Two areas per
session: a private, quota-limited /me workspace and a single shared public file
area /public (old-school BBS file area; world-read, members-only write by
default, operator-moderated). This reverses the old NG1 "no sharing" boundary in
favour of one sanctioned, inspectable sharing surface (PRD §9.3 amended).

internal/files:
- backend.go  service, layout, quota/usage, live-session registry, operator API
- fs.go       per-session virtual FS; resolve() is the single security
              chokepoint (area confinement + symlink-escape guard) + pkg/sftp
              request handlers
- server.go   subsystem handler: key auth -> member session -> request server,
              with byte metering and force-disconnect
- tui.go      in-BBS member browser (hub plugin "Files")
- admin.go    operator management TUI: sessions, workspaces/quotas, public area

Operator console: ssh sftp@<host> (allowlist-gated; sftpadmin@/filesadmin@
aliases) — list/disconnect sessions, set per-user quotas, revoke SFTP access,
toggle public write, moderate the public area.

store: files_access (per-user quota override + revoked) and files_settings
(public-write mode) tables + methods. main.go wiring guarded by AGENTBBS_FILES
(+ AGENTBBS_FILES_QUOTA_MB, default 1 GiB). Route names reserved.

Tests (incl -race): path traversal/confinement, symlink-escape rejection,
public-write ACL, quota enforcement, usage accounting, and an end-to-end run
against a real SFTP client. Docs: docs/files.md; PRD §5.3/§5.3.1/§9.3 + README
updated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-23 09:35:04 +00:00