* ci(deploy): preempt self-update timer so it can't starve the deploy lock
The self-update systemd timer redeploys from source (no SKIP_BUILD) and
can hold setup.sh's flock for >5min while compiling on a tiny droplet.
When it fires close to a CI push it starves the deploy, which waits the
full 5min on the lock and then fails with 'another setup.sh run is in
progress (lock held >5m)'.
The CI push is authoritative (ships prebuilt binaries + resets to the
exact commit), so stop any in-flight timer run to release the lock and
pause the timer before taking it. setup.sh re-enables the timer at the
end of its run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(files): isolate over-quota test from seeded-README baseline
TestWebSaveOverQuotaPreservesExistingFile set quota=5 but left sess.used
at the newSession baseline, which already counts the README.txt that
ensureUserPub seeds into /public (added in d19c5c4). That baseline alone
exceeds 5 bytes, so the initial 2-byte save was rejected with
'quota exceeded' before the test could exercise the over-quota replace.
Reset sess.used to 0 after setting the tiny quota, mirroring
TestQuotaEnforced, so the writer starts from a clean gauge.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
When the configured storage root (or a system temp dir on macOS where
/var → /private/var) is reached through a symlink, filepath.EvalSymlinks
on a child path resolves to the canonical form, but within() was comparing
against the lexical root — causing valid paths to be rejected with
"files: path escapes its area".
Fix: resolve the root once with EvalSymlinks before the symlink guard
loop, and compare resolved paths against the canonical root. The initial
lexical containment check (line 108) still uses the original root so
that the returned path keeps the caller's expected prefix.
Adds two regression tests:
- TestSafeJoinSymlinkedRoot: valid file under a symlinked root is accepted
- TestSafeJoinChildSymlinkEscapeStillBlocked: escaping child symlink is still rejected
Fixes#62
Co-authored-by: Kyle Paul Zengo <kylezengo@mac2012kylezengo.tail2f018b.ts.net>
ensureUserPub only ran os.MkdirAll, so a freshly-provisioned /public
(and thus ~<name>/public on the web) came up empty — only ~chovy had a
README because it was uploaded by hand. Embed that help text as a
default and write it whenever the area has no README.txt.
ensureUserPub is hit on SFTP connect (fs.go) and when the web host
materializes ~<name>/public (AnonRoot), so this self-heals every
existing empty member the next time they connect or their page is
viewed — no manual backfill. A member's own README is never clobbered.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Per feedback: /me is PRIVATE and the public folder must be its own
top-level area, not nested under /me.
- A member now has two sibling areas over SFTP: /me (private,
<root>/files/users/<name>) and /public (their own public files,
<root>/files/public/<name>), served anonymously at ~<name>/public.
- Drop the global shared /public web route and the /me/public nesting.
The anon surface only exposes ~name/public; /me has no anon route.
- Both owned areas count toward the quota gauge.
- Index publish hint, docs, and setup.sh updated to scp :/public/.
files.<host> stays a file server; member sites remain on the BBS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Re-model the web file host as a file server (not a website host):
- Drop the misnamed /site area. A member's public files are now their
/me/public subfolder (unix ~/public), served anonymously at
~<name>/public. The rest of /me stays private; only ~name/public is
ever exposed. Bare /~name redirects to /~name/public/.
- The root / is now a directory of ALL members, each linked to their BBS
site (https://<bbs-host>/~name via WebConfig.SiteBase) AND their public
files here (~name/public). No longer hides empty members.
- Sites/homepages stay on the BBS — files.<host> only links to them.
- Usage gauge is just /me again (which includes /me/public).
setup.sh + docs updated; tests cover ~name/public browse/download, the
bare-~name redirect, empty-member empty-listing, /public-only exposure,
and traversal confinement.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a third storage area, /site — each member's own public root, served
unauthenticated on the web at ~<name> alongside the shared /public.
Web file host (files.<host>) is no longer a login wall:
- GET / -> directory of members' ~user sites (+ sign-in link)
- GET /~<name>/... -> anon read-only browse + clean file URLs of /site
- GET /public/... -> anon read-only browse + clean file URLs of shared
area (fixes bare /public requiring login: the old
Caddy `handle_path /public/*` never matched /public)
Login is now optional and gates only private /me + writes. The anon
surface has no route into anyone's /me and safeJoin rejects traversal.
Usage gauge now sums the member-owned areas (/me + /site) instead of
/me alone; shared /public stays operator-managed and unmetered.
Caddy: route all of files.<host> to the Go manager. Docs + tests updated
(anon download/browse, traversal confinement, /site metering).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Implements M4 (Files). A fully virtual Go SFTP server (pkg/sftp + crypto/ssh,
no OS users) wired as an "sftp" subsystem on the existing :22 wish listener, so
members reach their files with their login key:
sftp files@bbs.profullstack.com # scp/rsync ride the same endpoint
Identity is the SSH key (the username is conventional/ignored). Two areas per
session: a private, quota-limited /me workspace and a single shared public file
area /public (old-school BBS file area; world-read, members-only write by
default, operator-moderated). This reverses the old NG1 "no sharing" boundary in
favour of one sanctioned, inspectable sharing surface (PRD §9.3 amended).
internal/files:
- backend.go service, layout, quota/usage, live-session registry, operator API
- fs.go per-session virtual FS; resolve() is the single security
chokepoint (area confinement + symlink-escape guard) + pkg/sftp
request handlers
- server.go subsystem handler: key auth -> member session -> request server,
with byte metering and force-disconnect
- tui.go in-BBS member browser (hub plugin "Files")
- admin.go operator management TUI: sessions, workspaces/quotas, public area
Operator console: ssh sftp@<host> (allowlist-gated; sftpadmin@/filesadmin@
aliases) — list/disconnect sessions, set per-user quotas, revoke SFTP access,
toggle public write, moderate the public area.
store: files_access (per-user quota override + revoked) and files_settings
(public-write mode) tables + methods. main.go wiring guarded by AGENTBBS_FILES
(+ AGENTBBS_FILES_QUOTA_MB, default 1 GiB). Route names reserved.
Tests (incl -race): path traversal/confinement, symlink-escape rejection,
public-write ACL, quota enforcement, usage accounting, and an end-to-end run
against a real SFTP client. Docs: docs/files.md; PRD §5.3/§5.3.1/§9.3 + README
updated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
